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The fact that it takes time for the brain to process information from the changing environ-
ment underlies many experimental phenomena of awareness of spatiotemporal events,
including a number of astonishing illusions. These phenomena have been explained from
the predictive and postdictive theoretical perspectives. Here I describe the most exten-
sively studied phenomena in order to see how well the two perspectives can explain them.
Next, the neurobiological perceptual retouch mechanism of producing stimulation aware-
ness is characterized and its work in causing the listed illusions is described. A perspective
on how brain mechanisms of conscious perception produce the phenomena supportive of
the postdictive view is presented in this article. At the same time, some of the phenomena
cannot be explained by the traditional postdictive account, but can be interpreted from the
perceptual retouch theory perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
In the changing environment our brains inevitably provide us with
a bit outdated percepts because of the time it takes to process
new information (Eagleman, 2008; Nijhawan, 2008; Nijhawan
and Khurana, 2010; Yamada et al., 2012). Obviously, this state
of affairs is adaptively disadvantageous. Evolution must have pro-
vided us with some means to compensate or correct the often
non-veridical perception vis-à-vis the actual appearance of the
changing scene in order to enable subjects to act efficiently and
interpret world around us veridically. The two most popular solu-
tions for explaining how sensory-perceptual and sensorimotor sys-
tems may overcome, reduce, or re-interpret this processing delay
dependent perceptual non-veridicality are prediction (Nijhawan,
1994, 2008; Kerzel, 2003; Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010 – all these asso-
ciated with an increasingly popular Bayesian account of predictive
encoding, e.g., Kersten et al., 2004; Bar, 2007; Hohwy et al., 2008)
and postdiction (Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000; Choi and Scholl,
2006; Eagleman, 2008; Buehner and Humphreys, 2010; Kawabe,
2011, 2012). (Approaches combining these accounts can be also
acknowledged, e.g., Soga et al., 2009.)
The empirical evidence where the limits of the perceptual sys-
tem in coping with challenges of the environmental stimulation
come to the fore is surprisingly rich, consisting in many well estab-
lished experimental awareness phenomena. In a recent review
(Bachmann et al., 2011) the following examples are listed where
spatiotemporal information is represented either non-veridically,
surprisingly poorly or as if seeing more than is there: anortho-
scopic perception, anthropomorphic perception effect of causality,
attentional blink, Aubert–Fleischl effect, autokinetic effect, biolog-
ical motion (Johansson effect), Cai and Schlag effect, change blind-
ness, Cohene and Bechtoldt effect, color-phi phenomenon, cuta-
neous rabbit phenomenon, Czermak effect, feature attribution,
feature inheritance, filled-duration illusion, flash-lag effect (FLE),
(continuous) flash-suppression effect, flicker fusion, Fröhlich
effect, Galli effect, induced-motion effect, Lawrence effect, line
motion illusion (Hikosaka effect), masking effects, motion cap-
ture, motion induced blindness (MIB), Motoyoshi effect, multiple
flash effects, path-guided motion, perceptual asynchrony effect,
perceptual latency priming, phenomenal causality (Michotte)
effect, proactive contrast facilitation, Pulfrich effect, repetition
blindness, representational momentum, repulsion effects, sequen-
tial blanking, size transformation effects, sound-induced illusory
flash phenomenon, standing wave illusion of invisibility, Stoper
and Mansfield effect, stroboscopic motion, tandem effect, tem-
poral context effect of brightness, temporal order reversal effect,
Ternus–Pikler effect, tunnel effect, ventriloquist effect, voluntary-
action effect on perception timing, wagon-wheel illusion, Zöllner
effect. Many of these phenomena are used for providing evidence
for predictive or postdictive accounts of explicit perception. In this
paper I will focus on some of these phenomena, indicate whether
the predictive or the postdictive account is consistent with them
and describe how the action of the perceptual retouch theory based
awareness mechanism explains these phenomena. The choice of
the seven phenomena for the purposes of the present article is not
haphazard. First, from the long list presented above only a cou-
ple of the phenomena have been frequently used in the context
of experimentation and theorizing trying to test or juxtapose both
the predictive and postdictive accounts of spatiotemporal process-
ing. Thus, only for a relatively limited set of the phenomena there
is a sufficiently voluminous published record of discussion rele-
vant to our topic. Second, space would not permit a systematic
analysis of all the phenomena in the context of prediction, post-
diction, and the perceptual retouch theory. Third, in order to be
able to compare the validity of the alternative theoretical accounts
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in explaining the phenomena, both of these accounts should have
statements and working principles specific enough with regard
to the spatiotemporal characteristics of the phenomena. This is
in order to make the comparative evaluation possible. This also
restricted our choice.
EXPERIMENTAL AWARENESS PHENOMENA AND THE TWO
ACCOUNTS
The most studied and discussed phenomena we use in this paper
can be listed as follows.
1. Flash-lag effect where a moving and a static (flashed) stimulus
are compared for their relative position (e.g., Nijhawan, 1994).
In perceptual awareness the moving object appears ahead of the
static flashed object even though actually they are aligned when
the flash is presented. The predictive account (Nijhawan, 1994,
2008) explains this phenomenon as a result of an active trans-
formation of the percept of the moving stimulus according to
this algorithm: compute the vector of the preceding position
change→ execute a corrective transformation of the ongoing
percept formation (predictive encoding)→ arrive at an illu-
sory percept corresponding to a highly likely anticipated reality
where the position of the moving object is shifted forward along
the motion vector. Compared to the perceived position of the
static flash this spatial advancement provides the foundation
for the illusory flash-lag. However, this account cannot explain
FLE found in the following experimental conditions: (i) the
flash-initiated conditions where the moving stimulus begins to
move only after the flash (i.e., no prediction basis is present;
Khurana and Nijhawan, 1995), (ii) motion-reversing (Whitney
and Murakami, 1998) conditions where the moving stimulus
changes its motion direction, (iii) conditions where in addition
to the moving reference stimulus another stimulus approaches
the reference from an opposite direction and thereby provides
a conflicting, canceling motion vector before the flash (Bach-
mann et al., 2012), (iv) conditions where the flash itself is also
briefly in motion (Bachmann et al., 2003). Thus, the events
after the flash must be responsible for the FLE. The postdictive
account (Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000; Eagleman, 2008) has
an advantage here.
2. The FLE when a spatially localized stimulation stream changes
its feature value (e.g., hue) and is evaluated against a flashed
probe stimulus that has an invariant feature value (e.g., Sheth
et al., 2000). Analogously to the motion version of the FLE,
the perceived feature value of the flashed stimulus appears to
lag behind the already seemingly advanced feature value of the
changing stimulation. Prediction of the change does not work
as an explanation here either. For example, when a target stim-
ulus is presented in a stream of featurally invariant and spatially
overlapping foil stimuli it is nevertheless perceived as appearing
before the reference stimulus flashed in a neighboring position
simultaneously with the target (Bachmann and Põder, 2001).
Thus, neither motion nor feature change is decisive for the
FLE. Prediction is useless, but some process that makes a newly
appearing stimulus slower in terms of its delay to consciousness
compared to an in-stream stimulus must be responsible for the
effect. The postdictive account (Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000;
Eagleman, 2008) has explained the FLE like this: encoding of
the features of the changing object/event → waiting for the
slowest feature to have been encoded→ re-interpretation of
the encoded signals post-dicted back in time to the moment
of flash to compensate the inevitable delay in feature process-
ing. However, because in Bachmann and Põder (2001) FLE was
found also when the target flashed in the stream and the refer-
ence flash presented out of the stream were simultaneous and
identical, but different from the stream items, it is difficult to
understand how the postdiction could lead to the FLE illusion.
3. Perception of causality in the “colliding stimuli” displays (e.g.,
Choi and Scholl, 2006). It has been found that visual events
can determine whether a collision is perceived in an ambigu-
ous situation even when those events occur after the moment
of “impact” in the putative collision has already passed. This
is consistent with the postdictive account of perception. Here
conscious perception again appears not as an instantaneous
percept formation, but comes about by integrating informa-
tion presented within short temporal windows, so that new
information can influence the immediate past in conscious
awareness.
4. The Fröhlich effect where the first perceived location of a newly
appearing moving object is shifted forward along the motion
direction (e.g., Müsseler and Aschersleben, 1998). This effect is
consistent with what the predictive account (Nijhawan, 2008)
would expect, provided that the computation of the motion sig-
nals is carried out very fast. However, the postdictive account
seems in trouble here. It remains unexplained why – even if
post-dictively and in retrospect – the first positions of the
moving object remain out of awareness.
5. Representational momentum – an effect where the perceived
end-position of a moving object when it stops “overshoots” its
actual position (e.g., Müsseler et al., 2002). This phenomenon
again is well accounted for by the predictive theory, but not so
easily by the postdiction theory.
6. Reappearance in awareness of the stimuli made subliminal in
the MIB displays (e.g., Mitroff and Scholl, 2004; Kawabe et al.,
2007). When the stimulus that disappeared from awareness a
moment ago changes its physical appearance when subjectively
invisible (e.g., is slanted during its blind episode), is switched off
when invisible and reappears in awareness again later, the con-
sciously perceived quality of it (e.g., slant) corresponds not to
how it appeared when last in awareness, but represents the stim-
ulus how it was presented subliminally before disappearance.
This is a bizarre mix of postdiction and prediction accounts of
conscious perception because a former stimulus state is rein-
stated (caused by flash or switch-off), but also its perceptual
characteristics were retrospectively reinstated in the direction
of change that was indicated unconsciously. The most intrigu-
ing work in this paradigm was presented by Wu et al. (2009).
They showed that a flash that caused reappearance of the tar-
get stimulus in awareness (after having been “subliminated”
by MIB) was itself consciously perceived as appearing later
than the reappearing target. At first this may seem paradox-
ical because the cause is perceived after its effect. Here, two
important insights to our knowledge about the neural basis
of conscious experience have to be noted. First, the findings
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by Wu et al. (2009) suggest that before reaching consciousness,
the non-conscious representation has to be processed for about
100 ms. Second, these results show that there has to be a non-
specific mechanism which brings the non-conscious specific
representation to consciousness – any explanation for these
results requires a process that is activated by the flash but at
the same time acts on the representation of the target (and
is, therefore, not specific for the target). I will return to this
theme in the next part of this article. As for the predictive
account there is nothing supportive in the Wu et al. (2009)
data. Predicting the past before future is suspect. The postdic-
tive account is better (i.e., reinstates what was there earlier, albeit
in the pre-conscious format), but requires additional assump-
tions for explaining why the flashed stimulus that caused the
reappearance of the target in awareness was not perceived at
the same time with the reappeared target. According to Eagle-
man (2008), for the visual brain to correctly align the timing
of events in the world, it may have to wait about 100 ms for
the slowest information to arrive – thereby allowing the visual
system to discount different delays imposed by the early stages.
In the Wu et al. (2009) experiment the flash comes when also
the target stimulus is present and has been present. Thus post-
dicting the flash-plus-target event back should have anyway
represented both the flash-stimulus and the target stimulus
together.
7. Anorthoscopic perception where the full shape of a moving stim-
ulus is perceived despite that only part of its contours are visible
through a slit at any moment in time is another phenome-
non relevant in our context (e.g., Zöllner, 1862; McCloskey
and Watkins, 1978; Aydin et al., 2008). Because this happens
also with new stimuli, the shape of which is unknown before-
hand to the perceivers, the prediction account cannot explain
this effect. If the system does not know the regularities of
change on which to found its predictive transformation, this
kind of transformation is not possible. However, the post-
dictive account assuming a time consuming spatiotemporal
integration of the unpredictable shape signals and motion
signals after they have been processed can explain the shape
formation post factum. Due to the space limitations I will
skip here some other relevant phenomena for which there
is sufficient level of specification allowing comparison with
our theories such as the line motion illusion (Hikosaka et al.,
1993) or the Tandem Effect (Müsseler and Neumann, 1992).
Suffice it to say that the explanations for them are basi-
cally similar to what will be given in the next section of this
article.
We saw that predictive and postdictive theory both had their
successes in explaining the listed phenomena. At the same time
these phenomena are the cases where subjective, conscious-
awareness-level representation is inconsistent with the objective,
physical characteristics of the presented stimulation. How the
known properties of the brain mechanisms necessary for con-
tentful conscious perception may be causally relevant in leading
to these illusory phenomena? Because these phenomena are typ-
ically the empirical basis for the theoretical arguments either in
favor of the prediction or the postdiction account it is useful to
see whether the workings of the awareness mechanism provide
explanations for the phenomena and thus provide a mechanistic
basis for either one of the theoretical accounts.
THE MECHANISMS FOR PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS
VIS-À-VIS THE PHENOMENA
In this article I stick to the neurobiological mechanisms respon-
sible for producing consciousness-level perceptual awareness as
was suggested in the perceptual retouch theory (Bachmann, 1984,
1994, 2007). Consciousness-level visual perception of the environ-
mental objects involves two types of binding operations, which
both require some time to be carried out. First, there is the
content-specific binding of features to integrated objects which
is accomplished by the selectively tuned cortical stimulus-specific
(SP-) modules in V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, and various temporal lobe
areas (Koch, 2004; Rose, 2006; Gazzaniga, 2009). The process-
ing by the SP-system can be carried out pre-consciously, without
a concomitant awareness (explicit perception) of the presented,
encoded and featurally bound stimuli (Naccache and Dehaene,
2001; Ruz et al., 2003; Kotchubey, 2005; Dehaene and Changeaux,
2011; van Gaal et al., 2011). Secondly, awareness of any of these
object requires the binding of the neural representation formed
by SP-operations with the more global and non-specific neural
activity supported by the thalamo-cortical processes of neuro-
modulation (Bachmann, 1994; Purpura and Schiff, 1997; Ribary,
2005; Bogen, 2007; Alkire et al., 2008; Urbano et al., 2012) that I
label as NSP (for “non-specific”). The NSP-processes do not com-
municate specific contents of the environmental stimuli, but they
are necessary in order to bring the specific contents represented
by SP-processes into consciousness-level representation. So, para-
doxically, non-specific is specific for providing the phenomenal
capacity for the specific contents. Interaction between cortical SP-
modules and the subcortical (e.g., non-specific thalamic) nuclei
constitutes the key mechanism for modulation of the SP-carried
perceptual contents by the NSP. The boost of NSP-activity is caused
by the presented stimulation and especially notably by the appear-
ance of the new inputs. (The ignition of the NSP system is one
of the subparts of the orienting reflex circuitry, its early working
part.) Importantly, the receptive fields of the neurons constituting
NSP are larger than the receptive fields of the neurons in the corti-
cal SP whose function is to process specific incoming signals from
the presented stimuli. Therefore, presentation of a certain spe-
cific stimulus with its specific content K can ignite a NSP-process
which is capable of modulating the activity of some other neurons
X with different specific content (even before the signals for X have
been presented). The presynaptic inputs from both, SP-channels
(from receptors via the lateral geniculate body up to the cortex)
and NSP-channels (from the thalamo-cortical modulation sys-
tem) converge on the cortical SP and both types of inputs regulate
the excitatory postsynaptic potentials of the SP neurons. When
this presynaptic input combining somatic and dendritic presy-
naptic effects from direct SP-channels and indirect NSP-channels
is strong enough (e.g., as applied onto pyramidal neurons with
their characteristic long apical dendrites), the specific neurons
begin firing or increase their firing rate. When only SP-channels
are active for representing actual stimulus objects but dissociated
from NSP influence, no consciousness of the perceptual contents
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of these objects can be experienced (Bachmann, 1994; Koch, 2004;
Ribary, 2005; Bogen, 2007). The SP works faster than NSP which
means that pre-conscious perceptual representation is formed
ahead in time with regard to the time when NSP-modulated con-
tents become consciously available. (The time difference between
an effective pre-conscious SP-encoding of objects with their bound
features and an effective process of NSP-modulation necessary
for awareness to emerge amounts to about 50–150 ms.) Figure 1
summarizes the general framework of the SP+NSP processing
system.
Within this framework, the phenomena reported in the current
article can be explained as follows.
1. Flash-lag effect where a moving and a static (flashed) stim-
ulus are compared for their relative position and the flash
appears to lag behind (e.g., Nijhawan, 1994). The retouch
theory explanation (Bachmann et al., 2003, 2012; Bachmann,
2010) is this: because the action of NSP takes more time than
SP-encoding and because no awareness of the SP-represented
contents emerges before NSP-modulation has had its effect, the
percept in awareness emphasizes features that are or become
present in SP somewhat later. For the features of the static flash
this means that its initial position as stored in sensory memory
will be“retouched”for consciousness, but for the features of the
moving stimulus this means “retouching” an advanced spatial
position for consciousness. (Additionally, the lingering sensory
trace of the moving stimulus is erased for SP by a Reichardt
type of movement detector; Reichardt, 1961.) This creates the
illusion of a spatial lag. This explanation is valid also for the
flash-initiated conditions, the conditions where the post-flash
movement directions are unpredictable and the conditions
where the pre-flash stimulation includes contradictory motion
direction signals that could nullify or complicate prediction
(Khurana and Nijhawan, 1995; Whitney and Murakami, 1998;
Bachmann et al., 2012). In some sense the retouch theory expla-
nation can be considered as a variety of the latency difference
account. For example, Whitney and Murakami, 1998, p. 657)
state that “The simplest explanation is that the neural delays for
the flash and the moving bar are different . . . approximately
45 ms . . . represents the difference between the latencies for
FIGURE 1 |The general framework of the perceptual processing
system featuring interaction of content-specific channels and
modules (Sp, Sp1, SPn) and the non-specific system of modulation
with its core in the subcortical nodes (NSP). The specific system for
contents works fast, can work pre-consciously, it integrates objects from
features and events from objects (it is the O-binding system). Contents
are represented by the cortical SPn. The non-specific system of
modulation works slowly (ignition of the boost in its activity by a stimulus
takes longer time), requires interaction between cortex and subcortex,
but it is necessary for modulating the activity of SPn up to the level or
activity mode where awareness of the contents represented by SPn
emerges. (The interactive NSP+SPn system is the C-binding system
subserving the function of binding the pre-conscious SP-representations
with the global scene represented in the conscious awareness format.)
Because modulation of SPn by afferents from NSP takes longer time
than pre-conscious encoding of SPn contents from Sp-Sp1, any
stimulus-input (e.g., Si) has a shorter latency to reach awareness when
preceded by some other stimulus-input (e.g., Si-1) compared to when no
preceding stimulation is presented and Si is presented alone. If Si is
presented alone, but changes its attributes when pre-conscious, it may
emerge in conscious awareness in the already changed capacity (e.g.,
shifted location, changed color, transformed shape).
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moving and flashed stimuli. Specifically, the delay for the mov-
ing bar is shorter. . ., perhaps because responses of motion
detectors at one location facilitate the response of other detec-
tors along the expected path of motion.” Actually, there are
some important differences between the simple latency dif-
ference account and the retouch theory explanation. It is not
essential that processing of the motion signals may be faster,
but that any signals with precedence have shorter delay to arrive
awareness because the action of the NSP (a system necessary for
awareness of the already pre-consciously represented stimuli)
has been activated in advance and the signals later in-stream
win time to reach conscious awareness. The latency difference
means latency-to-awareness, difference. Furthermore, as we
will see subsequently, the retouch mechanism explains FLE also
in the conditions where motion is not the case and static stimuli
are presented. The retouch mechanism supports the postdic-
tive account, but it also does not need the somewhat mystical
“referral back in time” (Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000).
2. Now let us consider the FLE effect when a spatially localized
stimulation stream changes its feature value (e.g., hue) and is
evaluated against a flashed probe stimulus that has an invariant
feature value (e.g., Sheth et al., 2000). FLE in this case is pro-
duced similarly to what was described in item 1 above. For the
newly appearing reference stimulus the fast SP-process and a
slow NSP-process are evoked. When the slow NSP-modulation
becomes effective, it helps to actualize the former feature value
of the reference stimulus stored in sensory memory. For the
object features within the stream of the changing stimulation
the process is relatively faster because the former stimulation-
instances from the stream have ignited the NSP-process ahead
in time and upon arrival of the new signals from the subse-
quent input within the stream the corresponding feature values
become available for awareness relatively earlier. Notice that
an analogous flash-lag (i.e., in-stream facilitation) effect was
obtained when the target stimulus within the stream was a
feature singleton and preceding items in-stream did not carry
any predictive cues (Bachmann and Põder, 2001). Importantly,
this stresses the non-specificity of the mechanism that modu-
lates SP-data for awareness. Any localized or spatially nearby
input can ignite NSP-modulation for subsequent stimuli that
can take advantage of this process even if featurally the stimuli
are considerably different. Thus, the predictive account cannot
help here. Surprisingly, the postdiction account also has its dif-
ficulty here. The FLE is present also when the in-stream target
and the out-of-stream reference are presented simultaneously
and referral back in time after the resetting of the timer due to
the flash (Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000) should find simulta-
neous identical stimuli – one in the stream and the other out of
the stream. (Notice that spatial positions of the stimuli do not
change and the in-stream target and reference are feature wise
identical stimuli.)
3. Perception of causality in“colliding stimuli”displays (e.g., Choi
and Scholl, 2006) where visual events can determine whether
a collision is perceived in an ambiguous situation even when
those events occur after the moment of “impact” in the puta-
tive collision has already passed: due to the slowness of the NSP
action an explanation similar to the FLE can be put forward
from within the retouch theory context. The general postdictive
account seems valid here.
4. The Fröhlich effect where the first perceived location of the
moving object that moves out from behind the occluder is
shifted forward along the motion direction (e.g., Müsseler and
Aschersleben, 1998). This effect is consistent with what the pre-
dictive account (Nijhawan, 2008) would expect, provided that
the computation of the motion signals is carried out very fast.
The postdictive account cannot explain why – even though
post-dictively and in retrospect – the first positions of the
moving object remain out of awareness. The retouch theory
naturally explains the Fröhlich effect: the slow NSP-modulation
arrives at the active SP-representation of the moving stimulus
when its position has been advanced during this NSP-delay.
(Why the former positions of the moving stimulus remain
invisible can be explained by the Reichardt detector effect can-
celing the trailing edge of the moving stimulus sensory trace
within SP.)
5. The next relevant phenomenon is representational momen-
tum where the last perceived position of a moving object when
it stops “overshoots” its actual position (e.g., Müsseler et al.,
2002). Predictive account is valid here, but both the postdictive
general account and the perceptual retouch mechanism based
explanation cannot provide any good solution unless accepting
that the SP-contents may be influenced by the mechanisms that
carry out extrapolatory correction.
6. Reappearance in awareness of the stimuli made subliminal
in the MIB displays (e.g., Mitroff and Scholl, 2004; Kawabe
et al., 2007) is our next phenomenon. The MIB stimulation
condition (the moving background noise and the static tar-
get stimuli being in conflict) causes decoupling of the NSP
influences selectively from the SP-representation of the target.
Because SP works pre-consciously and NSP is the necessary,
albeit slow modulation mechanism for conscious awareness of
the SP-contents, the following occurs. When NSP reassumes
its effective work at a later moment (either spontaneously or
due to an on- or off-transient) it also retouches the – pos-
sibly changed – feature values of the target. The paradoxical
appearance in awareness of the effect-related target stimulus
before the cause-related flashing stimulus (Wu et al., 2009) can
be explained by the perceptual retouch mechanism. Bachmann
and Aru (2009) suggested that “When the target object such
as used in the/Wu et al., 2009/fades from awareness, the SP
remains active in the mode sufficient for the representation of
the specific contents for the target, but has become dissociated
(i.e., desynchronized) from the NSP-activity necessary for con-
sciousness of the target. When the flashed object is presented,
two processes are triggered – the SP-process for representation
of the contents of the flashed stimulus and the (boost of or per-
turbation in the) NSP-process. This facilitated (or reset) NSP-
activity leads to binding of the already present pre-conscious
SP-activity of the target with global consciousness-level repre-
sentation. This binding process takes little time because there
is no need for build-up of the content-specific neural repre-
sentation for the target. In a putative computational model,
only phase resetting between the already functioning two oscil-
latory activities is required. Target reappears in consciousness
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fast. However, the flashed object appears in consciousness later
because the corresponding SP-representation of the flash has
to be built up ab ovo from the lower levels up to the higher
pattern levels and this takes some time. Therefore, the NSP that
brings contents to awareness finds the SP-contents of the target
ready on the “waiting list”; however, this NSP-activity has to
wait until the SP-contents of the flashed object become ready
(i.e., bound to the object representation to be bound into con-
sciousness). The predictive account is not useful here because
predicting the past before future is suspect. The general post-
dictive account needs some ways to explain why the flashed
stimulus that caused the reappearance of the target in aware-
ness was not perceived at the same time with the reappeared
target. Postdicting the flash-plus-target, event back should have
anyway represented both – the flash-stimulus and the target
stimulus.
7. The last phenomenon we consider is anorthoscopic perception
where the shape of a moving stimulus is perceived, although
only part of its contours are visible through a slit at any one
moment (e.g., Zöllner, 1862; McCloskey and Watkins, 1978). As
this happens also with new stimuli unknown to observers, the
prediction account cannot explain this effect. The postdictive
account assuming a time consuming spatiotemporal integra-
tion of the unpredictable shape signals and motion signals
after they have been processed can explain the shape forma-
tion post factum. Perceptual retouch account in its present
form cannot explain the effect unless the NSP effects can be
very slow and the SP-modules are termed to include high-
level visual-cognitive representations enabling more complex
dynamic transformations.
Table 1 summarizes my evaluations of whether the predic-
tive account, postdictive general account, and the retouch mech-
anism based mechanistic explanation are consistent with the
seven spatiotemporal phenomena of awareness used here for our
analysis.
It is easy to see that the predictive as well as postdictive account
both can explain more than half of the phenomena under con-
sideration. However, the distribution of the consistency ratings is
different. Except for the perception of causality in collision which
can be explained by both accounts without reservations, the other
phenomena are more puzzling for either the prediction or the
postdiction theory or both. Certain special varieties of motion-
involving FLEs and static FLEs cannot be accounted for by these
theories. Moreover, while the phenomena involving a kind of iner-
tia effects (Fröhlich effect and representational momentum) are
well accounted for by the predictive account, they cannot be eas-
ily explained by the postdictive account. On the other hand, the
predictive theory is in trouble trying to explain reappearance in
awareness after MIB and the anorthoscopic perception, both of
which can be either fully or partly explained by postdiction. In
the majority of cases the retouch mechanism also explains the
phenomena and where it does, it does this without reservations
(phenomena 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 from Table 1). For the “overshoot” effect
in the representational momentum phenomenon and for the “cre-
ative” formation of the full shape from its dynamic fragments in
the anorthoscopic effect the retouch theory does not have any
specialized modules helping to lead to these effects (items 5 and 7
in the Table).
From the Table 1 and the above analysis we see that no theory is
able to explain the effects singlehandedly. Each one has its advan-
tages and disadvantages. For some phenomena, the accounts are
not exclusive in their explanations and can be mutually consistent.
For example, the perceptual retouch mechanism can be consid-
ered as the neurobiological mechanism by which the phenomena
are produced, which in turn may become subject for the interpre-
tational higher order cognitive mechanisms working according
to the abstract principles of postdiction (1, 2, 3, 6 in the Table).
Regarding some phenomena, the contributions of the mechanisms
suggested in the three theories may be additive, such as when
motion extrapolation in certain varieties of the FLE or causality-
from-collision experimental setups are used as examples (items
1–3 in the Table). Importantly, future experiments must be use-
ful in trying to disentangle these relative contributions by clever
experimental designs allowing control over the variables specific
to each of the theories.
The general picture as it emerges from this analysis reveals
some main differences between the theoretical accounts. The pre-
dictive account may be relatively restricted to the lower level
effects involving motion and simple feature change analysis. The
postdictive account fares better with effects where relatively high-
level visual-cognitive processes play their part. The perceptual
retouch theory completes the picture by providing the neurobi-
ological foundations for the effects where conscious perception
represents the dynamic environment non-veridically because the
NSP component of the retouch mechanism is slow. As the NSP
component is necessary for upgrading the already processed infor-
mation for conscious awareness, the slowness dependent illusions
are inevitable in the direct perception. In the regulation of behavior
and cementing general knowledge of the dynamic world around
the subject higher level cognitive mechanisms implied in the
postdiction account may be of help.
Table 1 | Evaluation of the consistency of the three theoretical
explanations for the seven spatiotemporal perceptual awareness
phenomena.
The phenomenon
(see text)
Predictive
account
Postdictive
general
account
Perceptual retouch
mechanistic
explanation
1 +/− + +
2 +/− +/− +
3 + + +
4 + − +
5 + − −
6 − +/− +
7 − + −
Sum 4.0 4.0 5.0
+: Account/theory and the phenomenon are consistent.
−: Account/theory and the phenomenon are not consistent.
+/−: Consistency satisfied depending on which variety of the phenomenon is
used.
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Our comparative analysis suggests that a uniform explanation
of all of the observed effects seems impossible right now. There is
a complex interacting set of low-level and high-level mechanisms
and also the capacity of the visual system to execute sufficiently
sophisticated computations and encodings unconsciously. Given
the variability and complexity of the spatiotemporal stimulation
a subject may encounter and lack of unequivocally interpretable
and invariant set of cues to be processed, a single one relatively
simple mechanism may not be sufficient to account for all pos-
sible perceptual effects. Though having said this, it is surprising
that the perceptual retouch mechanism can explain majority of
the phenomena without reservations.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper I presented a mechanistic explanation for the typ-
ical visual awareness phenomena that have been used for testing
and advancing predictive and/or postdictive accounts of conscious
perception. It seemed natural to look for the mechanisms precisely
there where neurobiological data has shown what are the necessary
brain processes for the emergence of a contentful perceptual expe-
rience (Bachmann, 1994; Koch, 2004; Ribary, 2005; Bogen, 2007).
This small endeavor showed that both the predictive account and
the postdictive traditional account can explain more than half
of the “litmus-test” phenomena typically used in visual aware-
ness studies in the present theoretical context. Surprisingly or not,
the perceptual retouch theory based mechanistic explanation pro-
duced even a bit higher summary rating for the consistency (see
Table 1). This explanation also supports several of the postdictive
account principles, however this is without the need to invoke a
somewhat mystical concept of referral back in time. Simply the
delay to conscious awareness of featured perceptual information
depends on whether the target stimuli were preceded by other
input signals from spatially close/overlapping locations or not.
If there was precedence, the NSP-processes are prepared to have
their effect ahead in time and subsequent stimuli reach awareness
relatively faster.
I do hope also that the perspective suggested here and based on
the perceptual retouch theory of conscious perception might be
useful in order to specify the so-called postdictive account more
precisely in terms of the underlying neural mechanisms. Ulti-
mately, it may turn out that postdiction in its radical sense may not
be needed at all. On the other hand, the predictive account also
cannot be sufficient. Not least because there are too many experi-
mental effects of conscious vision unaccountable by the traditional
approaches.
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